

Interagency Security Committee

Security Standards For Leased Space

Approved September 29, 2004

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I. Background

When the Oklahoma City tragedy occurred in April of 1995, the government had no established building security standards for either Federally owned or leased buildings.

Shortly thereafter, the Department of Justice completed a study – “*Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities*”, dated June 28, 1995. Although the standards established by the study were primarily intended for use in all federally occupied facilities, they are not readily applicable to most leased locations. This in effect resulted in what many agencies saw as a security double standard for leased and owned buildings.

In order to address the apparent double standard, an Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Lease Security Subcommittee was established to develop a distinct set of standards specifically for leased locations. The subcommittee consisted of representatives from DOD, DOJ, DOT, HHS, IRS, SSA, US Courts, and GSA (National Office of Realty Services (NORS), National Capital Region (NCR), Federal Protective Service (FPS)(now part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)), and the Office of the Chief Architect (OCA). A complete list of participating members can be found in the Appendix to this document. The Lease Security Standards (for Levels I-IV) are the result of the subcommittee’s efforts.

In order to maintain consistency between our federally owned space and our leased space, the DOJ study was used as the basis for the lease security standards. However, providing the level of security control, access control, guard service, magnetometers, garage control, setbacks, etc. recommended by the DOJ study and attainable in a federally owned location, is not as easily attainable in the typical 10,000 square-foot lease. The subcommittee (well represented by facility, leasing, and security specialists) took into account the limitations imposed by the real estate markets. As a result, GSA took the proposed standards to Industry through four Security Roundtable sessions held in Washington, D.C., Chicago, San Francisco and New York. The comments received were invaluable and further allowed for the development of standards that will provide the maximum amount of security reasonably attainable and affordable within the market. In addition to the Industry Roundtables, the draft standards were also sent to all of the agencies represented on the Interagency Security Committee whereby they were further disseminated to many locations in the field around the country for comment. This allowed for a wide perspective of approaches to security issues. To that end, the security standards will not preclude leasing space in our major cities, as setback and blast protection will only apply to new construction, except for the application of shatter-resistant material on windows for Levels II-IV, and we have not eliminated the ability to have retail presence in our leased buildings.

II. Security Plan for Leased Space

It is the recommendation of this Subcommittee that agencies ensure any future lease acquisition contracts contain the Lease Security Standards as outlined in this report, and that they be incorporated as minimum requirements. Their application to existing buildings and lease construction projects is as follows:

A. New Leases in Existing Buildings

The appropriate security level for each lease requirement should be determined by an agency Security Specialist (except in the case of GSA leases, whereby FPS/DHS will make this determination in consultation with the tenant agency), based on a risk assessment as an application of the recommendations set forth in the Department of Justice "*Vulnerability Assessment of Federal Facilities*" (DOJ study), dated June 28, 1995. Where an agency anticipates making a new lease in an existing building (including succeeding lease actions), all of the ISC Lease Security Standards (operating standards) listed for that security level must be met, with the exception of those requirements specifically prescribed under "New Construction – Blast/Setback Standards. The standards will be considered minimum requirements; and it is the intent that offerors unwilling or unable to meet the requirements should be considered non-responsive. A distinction should be drawn between operating standards and new construction standards. Operating standards pertain to the operational and perhaps out-sourceable nature of security, i.e., access control via guard service, CCTV monitoring, magnetometers, x-ray machines and HVAC security, to name a few. While the minimum operating standards must be met, existing buildings are not required to meet the blast/setback standards required for new construction.

An agency, at their expense, may increase (but not decrease) the level of security required in the Lease Security Standards.* As an example, a recommended security Level III for an agency could be raised to a Level IV, at the agency's request; or perhaps only a specific, isolated standard could be added to the Level III requirement.

***Note:** See also Section IV A. Exceptions.

B. Lease Construction Projects

When lease construction will be sought (the SFO specifies a build-to-suit) to satisfy a requirement, the Lease Security Standards (operating standards) identified for the required security level shall be incorporated into lease construction Solicitation For Offers (SFOs). In addition, these projects shall incorporate the New Construction – Blast/Setback Standards specified in Section III for the specified security level as well as new construction design criteria contained in the "*ISC Security Design Criteria*", dated May 28, 2001, or latest version. In some cases, lease construction may be offered (although not specifically requested) in direct response to a solicitation for space (i.e., the Government may or may not be the anchor tenant). In this situation, the proposal for new construction would be held to the higher standards than that of potentially competing

existing buildings under the same solicitation. The existing buildings would be required to meet only the minimum lease security standards (operating standards only) and would not be subject to the new construction - blast/setback requirements or the ISC Design Criteria.

C. Existing Leases

Security requirements for existing leases should be considered whenever feasible on a case-by-case basis. It is recognized that the ability to attain security enhancements in a building currently under lease will be dependent on facility limitations, building owner acceptance, lease conditions and the availability of adequate funds. All existing GSA leases are currently included in FPS/DHS's cyclical building security assessment schedule. However, cyclical security assessments may not be initiated for buildings nearing expiration and should be performed prior to entering into a new lease.

III. Lease Security Standards

A. Level IV

A level IV facility has over 450 federal employees. In addition, the facility likely has:

- More than 150,000 square feet;
- High-volume public contact, and
- Tenant agencies that may include high-risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies, courts, judicial offices, and highly sensitive government records.

Note: It is possible, however, for a Level IV facility to have fewer than 450 employees for high-risk law enforcement and intelligence agencies, courts, judicial offices or those with highly sensitive government records.

1. Perimeter Security

a. Security control is required over public areas and building entry points. This includes adjacent surface parking lots and structures under the building owner's control. Private tenancies shall be expected to comply. Security control means (generally) the right to inspect at point of entry and at any time present in the public space, the right to deny access and the right to remove vehicles from the premises.

b. Security control is obtainable by any of 3 methods: lessor-furnished (turnkey), operating agreement (shared responsibility), or full leasehold control (government-furnished) depending on how the owners propose. The Government shall retain the right to provide control at anytime during the lease term.

c. Garage control does not require Government parkers, but may require Government garage management. Implementation of a vehicle pass/ID system for contract/monthly parkers, acceptable to the Government, is required. Signage is required to alert parking patrons to inspection and towing policies and removal of unauthorized vehicles.

d. Adequate lighting, with emergency power backup, for the exterior of the building is required. Parking areas shall also be adequately lighted.

e. 24-hour Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) surveillance cameras with time lapse video recording is required at lobbies and parking areas or as otherwise deemed necessary by a Government Security Specialist.

f. Applications of shatter-resistant material, acceptable to the Government, shall be applied on exterior windows in Government-occupied space.

2. Entry Security

a. Security Guards for public lobbies and public entrances shall be required for such purposes as, ID/pass control and manning x-ray and magnetometer equipment. Guards can be furnished via either lessor-furnished, operating agreement or full leasehold control methods. If guards are lessor-furnished, they shall be trained and licensed in accordance with Government standards. Guards manning magnetometers and x-ray equipment shall be armed.

b. Magnetometers, manned by armed Security Guards, are required at public entrances. Guards will direct the building population and visitors through the magnetometers.

c. All mail and packages entering the building shall be subject to x-ray screening and visual inspection by armed Security Guards. This includes packages and personal belongings of the building occupants and visitors, as well as shipments brought into a loading dock. The Government may divert large truck shipments to a secondary location for screening purposes. The Government reserves the right to negotiate security enhancements necessary for securing any unsecured non-federal block of space with a separate entrance (e.g., ground floor retail) based on a Government Building Security Assessment.

d. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with central monitoring capability is required for the building perimeter. An internal IDS may be required as determined by a Government Security Specialist.

e. Exterior entrances shall have high security locks.

f. Leases shall state that the Government reserves the right to post applicable Government rules and regulations at each public entrance in a Federally-occupied facility for such things as, but not limited to, barring the unauthorized possession of firearms and dangerous weapons.

3. Interior Security

a. Acceptable government-issued (e.g. drivers license) photo ID for all building occupants upon entry to the building is required.

b. A visitor control/screening system, acceptable to the Government, is required. At a minimum, the system shall require Security Guards to screen visitors but could result in a level of control that may require escorting them.

c. Utility areas shall be secured and only authorized personnel shall have access.

d. Emergency power sources to critical systems (alarm systems, radio communications, computer facilities, CCTV monitoring, fire detection, entry control devices, etc) are required.

e. To protect the building environment from airborne chemical, biological, or radiological attacks, specific protection measures shall be required.

(1). Accessible fresh air intakes shall either be relocated, extended or secured to prevent easy ground or roof access.

(2). Access to mechanical areas and building roofs shall be strictly controlled.

(3). Dedicated Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) shall be required for lobbies, centrally-operated mailrooms (specifically required by the government) and loading docks, to prevent widespread dispersion of a contaminant released in those areas.

(4). Procedures (should airborne hazards be suspected or found) are required for the notification of the lessor's building manager, building security guard desk, local emergency personnel, or other Government emergency personnel, for the possible shutdown of air handling units serving any possibly affected areas.

(5) Securing accessible return-air grilles is required. Protection measures shall not adversely affect the performance of the building HVAC system.

(6) Access to building information, including mechanical, electrical, vertical transport, fire and life safety, security system plans and schematics, computer automation systems, and emergency operations procedures shall be required. Such information shall be released to

authorized personnel only. Names and locations of Government tenants shall not be disclosed within any publicly accessed document or record.

(7). A fire alarm system, with voice communication, is required for emergency notification and instructions to building tenants, in the event of possible contamination of the HVAC system or other emergency.

4. Administrative Procedures

a. Building managers and owners are required to cooperate with and participate in the development and implementation of Government Occupant Emergency Plans (OEP).

b. Conduct background security checks and/or establish security control procedures for contract service personnel as deemed necessary.

c. The Government reserves the right, at its own expense and manpower, to temporarily upgrade security during heightened security conditions due to emergency situations such as terrorist attacks, natural disaster and civil unrest. The measures shall be in accordance with the latest version of the Homeland Security Advisory System.

5. New Construction - Blast/Setback Standards

a. For any lease resulting in new construction (not existing buildings), in addition to the above Minimum Lease Security Standards, the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Design Criteria, dated May 28, 2001 or latest version, shall also apply as well as the following blast/setback standards shall be met:

1. For non-law enforcement agencies (excluding childcare, but including the U.S. Courts), a 50 foot setback¹ guideline with appropriate window glazing, as prescribed by WINGARD 3.15 or later or WINLAC 4.3 software, to achieve a glazing performance condition of 3b² and a façade protection level of "medium"³ given a blast load standard of 4 psi/28 psi-msec is required.

2. For childcare facilities, a 50 foot setback¹ guideline with appropriate window glazing, as prescribed by WINGARD 3.15 or later or WINLAC 4.3 software, to achieve a glazing performance condition of 2⁴ and a façade protection level of "higher"⁵ given a blast load standard of 4 psi/28 psi-msec is required.

3. For some law enforcement agencies, a 100 foot setback¹ guideline with appropriate window glazing, as prescribed by WINGARD 3.15 or later or WINLAC 4.3 software, to achieve a glazing performance

condition of 2⁴ and a façade protection level of "higher"⁵ given a blast load standard of 10 psi/89 psi-msec is required.

¹ Setback refers to the distance from the face of the building's exterior to the protected/defended perimeter (i.e., any potential point of explosion). This would mean the distance from the building to the curb or other boundary protected by bollards, planters or other street furniture. Such potential points of explosion may be, but no limited to, such areas that could be accessible by any motorized vehicle (i.e. street, alley, sidewalk, driveway, parking lot).

² Glazing Performance Condition 3b provides for a high protection level and a low hazard level. For a blast of 4psi/28psi-msec, the glazing cracks and fragments enter the space and land on the floor not further than 10 ft. from the window.

³ A "Medium Level Protection" to the facade will result in moderate damage, but repairable. The facility or protected space will sustain a significant degree of damage, but the structure should be reusable. Some casualties may occur and assets may be damaged. Building elements other than major structural members may require replacement.

⁴ Glazing Performance Condition 2 provides for a very high protection level and a hazard level of "none". For a blast of 4psi/28psi-msec or 10psi/89 psi-msec, the glazing cracks but is retained by the frame. Dusting or very small fragments near the sill or on the floor are acceptable.

⁵ A "Higher Level Protection" to the facade will result in minor damage, but repairable. The facility or protected space may globally sustain minor damage with some local significant damage possible. Occupants may incur some injury, and assets may receive minor damage.

B. Level III

A Level III facility has between 151 and 450 federal employees. In addition, the facility likely has:

- From 80,000 to 150,000 square feet;
- A moderate/high volume of public contact; and
- Tenant agencies that may include law enforcement agencies, court/related agencies and functions, and government records and archives.

A major distinction is made from Level IV requirements, in that, for Level III the Government will not have security control over public areas and building entry points except in the case of a 100% Government-occupied Level III building. For a fully occupied Level III building, the government reserves the right, at its own expense and manpower, to control the building entry points, (i.e., lobby, loading dock, etc) and parking areas. In addition, dedicated HVAC for lobbies, centrally operated mailrooms and loading docks is also not required for this level. Another distinction is that a 20-foot setback guideline is required for blast protection for new construction projects. Following is a more detailed list of the requirements for Level III:

1. Perimeter Security

- a. Security control for parking (surface lots, adjacent structures, underground garages under the Lessor's control) is solely limited to securing

official Government vehicles from accessibility through fencing or other means. It does **not** mean the right to inspect at point of entry, the right to deny access or the right to remove vehicles. In the event of full building occupancy, however, the Government reserves the right to control all associated parking.

b. Adequate lighting, with emergency power backup, for the exterior of the building is required. Parking areas shall also be adequately lighted.

c. 24-hour CCTV surveillance cameras with time-lapse video recording **may** be required as deemed necessary by a Government Security Specialist.

d. Applications of shatter-resistant material, acceptable to the Government, shall be applied on exterior windows in Government-occupied space.

2. Entry Security

a. The Government reserves the right to require Security Guards (may be government-furnished), as may be deemed necessary, for full building occupancies.

b. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with central monitoring capability is required for the building exterior. As internal IDS may be required as determined by a Government Security Specialist.

c. The Government reserves the right to require x-ray and magnetometers (may be government-furnished and operated) at public entrances, as may be deemed necessary for the screening of personnel, mail and packages, for full building occupancies only. Security guards manning the x-ray and magnetometers shall be armed.

d. Exterior entrances shall have high security locks.

e. Leases shall state that the Government reserves the right to post applicable Government rules and regulations at the entrance to any Government-occupied space for such things as, but not limited to, barring the unauthorized possession of firearms and dangerous weapons. In the case of a full building occupancy, however, the notice shall be posted at each public entrance to the facility.

3. Interior Security

a. The government reserves the right to require visitor screening (may be government-furnished) in full building occupancies.

b. Utility areas shall be secured and only authorized personnel shall have access.

c. Emergency power sources to critical systems (i.e., alarm systems, radio communications, computer facilities, CCTV monitoring, fire detection, entry control devices, etc) are required.

d. To protect the building environment from airborne chemical, biological, or radiological attacks, specific Heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) protection measures shall be required.

(1) Accessible fresh air intakes shall either be relocated, extended or secured to prevent easy ground or roof access.

(2) Access to mechanical areas and building roofs shall be strictly controlled.

(3) Securing accessible return-air grilles is required. Protection measures shall not adversely affect the performance of the building HVAC system.

(4) Access to building information, including mechanical, electrical, vertical transport, fire and life safety, security system plans and schematics, computer automation systems, and emergency operations procedures shall be required. Such information shall be released to authorized personnel only. Names and locations of Government tenants shall not be disclosed within any publicly accessed document or record.

(5) Procedures (should airborne hazards be suspected or found) are required for the notification of the lessor's building manager, building security guard desk, local emergency personnel, or other Government emergency personnel, for the possible shutdown of air handling units serving any possibly affected areas.

4. Administrative Procedures

a. Building managers and owners are required to cooperate with and participate in the development and implementation of Government Occupant Emergency Plans (OEP).

b. Conduct background security checks and/or establish security control procedures for contract service personnel as deemed necessary.

c. The Government reserves the right, at it's own expense and manpower, to temporarily upgrade security during heightened security conditions due to emergency situations such as terrorist attacks, natural disaster and civil unrest. The measures shall be in accordance with the latest version of the Homeland Security Advisory System.

5. New Construction - Blast/Setback Standards

a. For any lease resulting in new construction (not existing buildings), in addition to the above Minimum Lease Security Standards (operating standards), the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Design Criteria, dated May 28, 2001, or latest version, shall also apply as well as the following blast/setback standards shall be met:

1. 20 foot setback¹ guideline with appropriate window glazing, as prescribed by WINGARD 3.15 or later or WINLAC 4.3 software, to achieve a glazing performance condition of 3b² and a façade protection level of "medium"³ given a blast load standard of 4 psi/28 psi-msec.

¹ Setback refers to the distance from the face of the building's exterior to the protected/defended perimeter (i.e., any potential point of explosion). This would mean the distance from the building to the curb or other boundary protected by bollards, planters or other street furniture. Such potential points of explosion may be, but no limited to, such areas that could be accessible by any motorized vehicle (i.e. street, alley, sidewalk, driveway, parking lot).

² Glazing Performance Condition 3b provides for a high protection level and a low hazard level. For a blast of 4psi/28psi-msec, the glazing cracks and fragments enter the space and land on the floor not further than 10 ft. from the window.

³ A "Medium Level Protection" to the facade will result in moderate damage, but repairable. The facility or protected space will sustain a significant degree of damage, but the structure should be reusable. Some casualties may occur and assets may be damaged. Building elements other than major structural members may require replacement.

C. Levels II & I

A Level II facility has between 11 and 150 federal employees. In addition, the facility likely has:

- From 2,500 to 80,000 square feet;
- A moderate volume of public contact; and
- Federal activities that are routine in nature, similar to commercial activities.

A Level I facility has 10 or fewer federal employees. In addition, the facility likely has:

- 2,500 or less square feet of office space; and
- A low volume of public contact or contact with only a small segment of the population.

Due to the level of similarity in security requirements for these two levels, they will be combined, with distinctions drawn when appropriate. Like Level III, Levels II and I will also not have security control over public areas and building entry points. However,

there is no increase in security control for full building occupancies at these two levels. Also distinct from Level III, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is not required for Levels II and I; therefore, peep holes, intercom systems, and entry control with CCTV and door strikes may be required as deemed necessary. Shatter-resistant material for windows is required for Level II, but not for Level I. As with Level III, dedicated HVAC for lobbies, centrally operated mailrooms and loading docks are also not required for these levels. One more distinction would be that, like Level III, a 20 foot setback guideline is required for blast protection for new construction projects for Level II and I; however, a Blast Load Standard, Glazing Performance Condition or Façade Protection Level is **not** required for Level I buildings. Following is a more detailed list of the requirements for Levels II and I:

1. Perimeter Security

- a. Security control for parking (surface lots, adjacent structures, underground garages under the Lessor's control) is solely limited to the assignment (marked "reserved") of authorized Government parking spaces and vehicles.
- b. Adequate lighting, with emergency power backup, for the exterior of the building is required. Parking areas shall also be adequately lighted.
- c. 24-hour CCTV surveillance cameras with time-lapse video recording **may** be required as deemed necessary by a Government Security Specialist.
- d. For Level II, applications of shatter-resistant material, acceptable to the Government, shall be applied on exterior windows in Government-occupied space. This requirement does not apply for Level I buildings.

2. Entry Security

- a. Security Guards **may** be required, as deemed necessary by a Government Security Specialist.
- b. Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with central monitoring capability **may** be required, as deemed necessary by a Government Security Specialist, for the building exterior.
- c. Peepholes in exterior doors **may** be required, as deemed necessary by a Government Security Specialist, when an IDS is not appropriate.
- d. An intercom system, used in conjunction with a peephole, **may** be required as deemed necessary by a Government Security Specialist.

e. Entry control with CCTV and door strikes **may** be required to allow employees to view and communicate remotely with visitors before allowing access, as deemed necessary by a Government Security Specialist.

f. Exterior entrances shall have high security locks.

g. Leases shall state that the Government reserves the right to post applicable Government rules and regulations at the entrance to any Government-occupied space for such things as, but not limited to, barring the unauthorized possession of firearms and dangerous weapons.

3. Interior Security

a. A visitor control/screening system is not required for these levels.

b. Utility areas shall be secured and only authorized personnel shall have access.

c. Emergency power sources to critical systems (i.e., alarm systems, radio communications, computer facilities, CCTV monitoring, fire detection, entry control devices, etc) are required.

d. The following requirements pertain to the added protection of the building environment from airborne chemical, biological, or radiological attacks.

(1) Access to mechanical areas and building roofs shall be strictly controlled.

(2) Access to building information, including mechanical, electrical, vertical transport, fire and life safety, security system plans and schematics, computer automation systems, and emergency operations procedures shall be required. Such information shall be released to authorized personnel only. Names and locations of Government tenants shall not be disclosed within any publicly accessed document or record.

(3) Procedures (should airborne hazards be suspected or found) are required for the notification of the lessor's building manager, building security guard desk, local emergency personnel, or other Government emergency personnel, for the possible shutdown of air handling units serving any possibly affected areas.

4. Administrative Procedures

a. Building managers and owners are required to cooperate with and participate in the development and implementation of Government Occupant Emergency Plans (OEP).

b. Conduct background security checks and/or establish security control procedures for contract service personnel as deemed necessary.

c. The Government reserves the right, at its own expense and manpower, to temporarily upgrade security during heightened security conditions due to emergency situations such as terrorist attacks, natural disaster and civil unrest. The measures shall be in accordance with the latest version of the Homeland Security Advisory System.

5. New Construction - Blast/Setback Standards

a. For any lease resulting in new construction (not existing buildings), in addition to the above Minimum Lease Security Standards (operating standards), the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Design Criteria, dated May 28, 2001 or latest version, shall also apply as well as the following blast/setback standards shall be met:

1. For Level II, a 20 foot setback¹ guideline with appropriate window glazing, as prescribed by WINGARD 3.15 or later or WINLAC 4.3 software, to achieve a glazing performance condition of 3b² and a façade protection level of "medium"³ given a blast load standard of 4 psi/28 psi-msec is required. For Level I, the setback guideline is also 20 feet; however there is neither a blast load standard, glazing performance condition nor façade protection level requirement.

¹ Setback refers to the distance from the face of the building's exterior to the protected/defended perimeter (i.e., any potential point of explosion). This would mean the distance from the building to the curb or other boundary protected by bollards, planters or other street furniture. Such potential points of explosion may be, but not limited to, such areas that could be accessible by any motorized vehicle (i.e. street, alley, sidewalk, driveway, parking lot).

² Glazing Performance Condition 3b provides for a high protection level and a low hazard level. For a blast of 4psi/28psi-msec, the glazing cracks and fragments enter the space and land on the floor not further than 10 ft. from the window.

³ A "Medium Level Protection" to the facade will result in moderate damage, but repairable. The facility or protected space will sustain a significant degree of damage, but the structure should be reusable. Some casualties may occur and assets may be damaged. Building elements other than major structural members may require replacement.

IV. Exceptions

The following will be considered exceptions to the normal process for selecting minimum security requirements and satisfying space needs.

A. Exceeding Standards. For most actions (those to be done by GSA), the security level recommended by FPS/DHS for a given requirement will be used and the standards for that level will be incorporated into solicitations as minimum requirements. However, if an agency chooses to (1) select a higher security level or (2) insert additional security line items exceeding the FPS/DHS recommendation, or (3) insists upon a build-to-suit solution when compliant existing space is available, or (4) requires formal Source Selection Procedures to achieve an above-minimum security solution, a written justification by the requesting agency's ordering official must be prepared, for the project file, to justify exceeding the standard.

B. No market Solution is Available. In the event no security compliant space can be acquired in existing space, and a build-to-suit, Federal space, or security lease consolidation is not possible, then the best security solution available should be obtained. In this case, the project file shall be adequately documented to reflect the limiting conditions and the future plan for moving to security compliant space.

V. Summary

In conclusion, these Lease Security Standards are **minimum** standards. There is not a provision for a waiver of the minimum standards. It is recognized that different agencies may arrive at this level of security in different ways. Some Law Enforcement agencies or Defense-related agencies may have their own standards based on unique mission criticality. Others wanting to go above the standards should weigh carefully the underlying rationale and cost for doing so. The General Services Administration can provide standard lease provisions as well as standard lease practices, which can assist agencies in the implementation of these standards.

APPENDIX

Subcommittee Leader:

Bill Jenkins, GSA, National Office of Realty Services (NORS)

Subcommittee Members:

The following list of names recognizes the representatives from the various agencies who participated on the Interagency Security Committee Subcommittee in the development of these security standards. It should be noted that not every member listed spent an equal amount of time working with the Subcommittee. Many, however, were consistent key players and were present throughout the entire process. It is also understood that not all members listed agree with every aspect of the standards, however, this was a consensus document and therefore reflects the basic security needs of all agencies and their employees, while working within the parameters of the existing marketplace.

Lisa Ward, DOJ (DHS)	Joe Hartman, ARMY COE
Ben Burrell, DOJ (DHS)	Bill Norton, FAA
Naida Meares, IRS	John Newton, FAA
Joe Giardino, IRS	Christopher Connell, FAA
Keith Hughes, SSA (FPS/DHS)	Mel Basye, GSA/FPS (retired)
Paul Murray, SSA	Dennis O'Connor, GSA (FPS/DHS)
Bette Hoffman, SSA	Paul Constable, GSA (FPS/DHS)
John Jester, DOD	Dean Hunter, GSA (FPS/DHS)
Gate Lew, US Courts	Steve Smith, GSA/OCA
Will Liston, HHS	Wade Belcher, GSA/OCA
Lee Privett, DOT	Art Turowski, GSA/NCR
John Kerns, DOT	Ken Holstrom, GSA/NORS
Michael Finkelstein, ARMY	Wendy Liebl, GSA/NCR (NORS)
Peter Rossbach, ARMY	